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ABSTRACT 
 
Although often assessed at an organizational level, a market-oriented culture is supported by the 
attitudes and actions of the organization’s employees. A firm cannot develop a market 
orientation strategy without each employee’s active understanding, willingness, and ability to 
perform in a market-oriented fashion. Therefore, individual employees must experience a 
responsibility to gather and assess the value of market information, and a willingness to share it 
with other employees. We surveyed a cross-section of employees at many levels and roles in 
different North American financial services organizations. This research identified important 
individual level antecedents that organizations must account for when attempting to stimulate 
company-wide market-oriented behaviors. These include the fostering of high quality and 
matched psychological contracts, modeling of learning strategies by agile learners, and increased 
opportunities and time to develop personal ties between customers and employees in diverse 
roles within the firm.   
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INDIVIDUAL LEVEL ANTECEDENTS TO MARKET-ORIENTED 
ACTIONS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Market orientation is an important theme in the marketing literature, and there is a 
substantial literature on it. Market-oriented firms “seek to understand customers’ expressed and 
latent needs, and develop superior solutions to those needs” (Slater and Narver, 1999, p. 1165).  
A firm’s market orientation builds upon three dimensions: the organization-wide acquisition, 
dissemination, and co-ordination of market intelligence (Jaworski and Kohli, 1993).  
The market orientation literature is replete with theoretical and empirical studies 
describing the importance of market orientation to firm performance at an organizational level of 
analysis (e.g., Farrell, 2000, Han et al., 1998, Jaworski and Kohli, 1993, Narver and Slater, 
1990). However, researchers have rarely studied the contribution of individuals. A concentration 
on the firm level construct ignores the underlying routines carried out by individuals that develop 
and form the orientation (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Although researchers have viewed these 
routines from an organizational level, few consider the actions of individual employees, or 
attempt to understand the social-psychological drivers of market orientation within a firm (e.g., 
Farrelly and Quester, 2003, Jones et al., 2003).  
Narver (1990) suggested firm market orientation requires internalization of core 
customer-oriented values by individual employees. A psychological contract represents 
exchanged promises between employee and employer and is a key mechanism in this 
internalization process. To explain, when employers promise stable employment, and promotion 
and development opportunities, employees reciprocate by promising to take actions to fulfill core 
values expressed by the company, including market-oriented actions. Rousseau (1995) maintains 
 5 
that individuals voluntarily enter into a psychological contract, and choose whether they will 
fulfill a promise or obligation.  However, although there may be a voluntary element about the 
process, a feeling of “obligation” implies no choice for a conscientious person.  When employees 
initiate market-oriented actions, they are likely to internalize market-oriented values through a 
process of cognitive dissonance and routine (Festinger, 1957, Salancik, 1977). Cognitive 
dissonance occurs when a person’s beliefs and feelings are inconsistent with their behaviors. 
Consequently, tension or dissonance occurs that can only be resolved by aligning these 
perceptions.  If behaviours are not market-oriented, yet employees feel obligated to be market-
oriented, then the employees are likely to reframe their belief so that they rationalize why they 
are, in fact, not obligated to be market-oriented.  
Individuals contribute to organization level market-orientation through actions such as 
fostering internal and external relationships (Helfert et al., 2002), and communicating tacit 
knowledge (Darroch and McNaughton, 2003). This research adapts the organizational level 
definition of market orientation provided by Kohli and Jaworski (1990) to the individual; that is, 
the market orientation of individuals reflects the attitudes and behaviors of employees as they 
acquire, share, and respond to market intelligence. In order to develop a market orientation 
strategy, firms must convince employees to “buy-into” the concept (Piercy et al., 2002).  If 
organizations are unable to build awareness, ability, and motivation to act in market-oriented 
ways, they may face employee resistance to market-oriented initiatives causing an inability to 
effectively implement strategy (Harris, 2002). 
 A firm’s market orientation depends upon obligations of market-oriented behaviors 
shared by management and its employees. Employees acquire information about customers and 
competitors, and share it with others within the same firm (Darroch and McNaughton, 2003). 
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Thus it is important to understand individual and interpersonal variables that enhance the 
exchange of knowledge within the organization. Unwritten role obligations are communicated 
through relationships between employer and employee, and are often studied within the 
theoretical framework of the psychological contract (Rousseau, 1989). Accordingly, Rousseau 
(1998, p. 668) notes that “individual beliefs comprising the contract involve sets of reciprocal 
obligations – not expectations alone – to which both the individual and the other party are 
believed to have committed themselves…Although obligations are a form of expectation, not all 
expectations held by a person need to be promissory or entail a belief in mutuality or reciprocity. 
By definition, a psychological contract must be based upon a belief that a reciprocal exchange 
exists which is mutually understood.”  
Employees may be unwilling to act in market-oriented ways if they perceive an 
organization to contribute at a low level or less than the employee expects, given the employees’ 
own contributions to the psychological contract. For example, by being reluctant to be involved 
in organizational decision-making processes (Paul et al., 2000), or hoarding market information 
in anticipation of self-employment or for employment opportunities with competitors (Harris and 
Ogbonna, 2001). Additionally, employees may not feel obligated to develop strong customer 
relationships if they believe that in general the company does not fulfill its obligations 
(Eddleston et al., 2002). Thus, this research considers how market-oriented behaviors may be 
shaped by mutual obligations within the psychological contract between the employee and 
employer.   
Although popular with psychologists, the study of psychological contracts is largely 
overlooked by researchers in the marketing field.  Notably, only a few articles exist that apply 
the theory of psychological contracts in the context of marketing activity within the firm.  
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(specifically, Blancero et al., 1996, Blancero and Johnson, 2001, Eddleston  et al., 2002, 
Llewellyn, 2001).  Few of the marketing studies develop the role of psychological contracts from 
the perspectives of employees across the organization, preferring to focus on those with close 
customer contact, such as sales. This study extends empirical knowledge of marketing 
orientation from the opinions of senior level marketing or quality control managers (e.g., 
Kennedy et al., 2002) to other front-line employees. It contributes knowledge gained from social 
psychology to the marketing field.  
First, this paper reviews the literature on employee psychological contracts. Then we 
present and explain hypotheses relating employee perceptions of the psychological contract, 
learning orientation, and role-based customer interaction to perceptions of their own market-
oriented behaviors.  These relationships are tested and discussed in a cross-sectional survey of 
financial services employees.   Finally, we discuss the implications, limitations and contributions 
of the research to the marketing field. 
 
INDIVIDUAL LEVEL ANTECEDENTS TO INDIVIDUAL MARKET-ORIENTED 
BEHAVIORS  
Previous market orientation research at the individual level has focused upon either a 
customer-oriented disposition (e.g., Brown et al., 2002) or alternatively on various individual 
level antecedents or outcomes of a market orientation strategy (e.g., Celuch et al., 2000). This is 
problematic because the customer-oriented disposition narrowly targets the customer and does 
not identify trainable actions. The other stream identifies important individual level issues, but 
does not test them in the context of market-oriented behaviors performed by each employee. To 
fill the void, this research examines selected antecedents to individual market-oriented behaviors.  
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At the organizational level, researchers relate market orientation to learning orientation 
(Baker and Sinkula, 1999), to channel relationships (Langerak, 2001, Siguaw et al., 1998), and to 
inter-functional differences (Atuahene-Gima, 1996). These contributing factors at an 
organizational level provide some rationale for further investigation at an individual level 
because an organization collectively reflects the values and actions of individuals it employs. 
Consequently, this research tests individual level constructs related to learning orientation, 
channel relationships, and inter-functional differences. Specifically, we posit several reasons for 
market-oriented actions at the individual level, based upon individual learning agility, the 
psychological contract, and role-related differences in the level of customer contact. 
 
 
Developing Market Orientation Obligation within Psychological Contracts 
The psychological contract explains how role obligations shared by the employee and 
employer can shape the employee’s market-oriented practices. “The psychological contract is 
individual beliefs, shaped by the organization, regarding terms of an exchange agreement 
between individuals and their organization.” (Rousseau, 1995, p. 34).  These beliefs reflect the 
promises made, accepted, and relied on between themselves and another (employee, client, 
manager, organization). Here, the concept of psychological contract obligations is extended to 
consider employee perceptions of their own market-oriented obligations.  
The psychological contract envisions the exchange of promises between employee and 
organization. The organization provides inducements in the form of wages, fringe benefits, 
nature of the job, and working conditions (March and Simon, 1958). These inducements are 
realized when employers fulfill their obligations, and can be differentiated from anticipated or 
future obligations (Coyle-Shapiro, 2002). Obligations require that the employee trust the 
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employer to deliver them at some point in the future. When that trust is present, the employee 
responds with increased involvement (Coyle-Shapiro, 2002, Paul  et al., 2000).   
Psychological contracts can be transactional (characterised as usually extrinsic, short-
term, static and specified) or relational (intrinsic, long-term, dynamic and open-ended). This 
paper focuses upon relational contracts because the long-term nature of relational psychological 
contracts permits a focus upon long-term strategic implications for firm-value. Employees who 
experience a fulfilled relational contract are less likely to seek employment elsewhere 
(Cavanaugh and Noe, 1999). Anderson and Schalk (1998) described renewed research interest in 
the psychological contract, noting that the contract has become more flexible and unstructured. 
Employees must assume responsibilities, previously considered to be outside of normal role 
obligations, related to innovation, entrepreneurship, training, and career development. Integral to 
these new contract promises is a heightened awareness of the need to manage market 
information.  
 
Psychological Contract Quality and Reciprocity 
Rousseau (Rousseau and Tijoriwala, 1998, p. 681) defined the psychological contract as 
“an individual’s belief in the reciprocal obligations arising out of the interpretation of promises”. 
This definition reflects development of “exchange agreement”, (Rousseau, 1995) to more clearly 
reflect reciprocity in the psychological contract.  This research uses Rousseau’s conception of a 
psychological contract anchored with strong promises and obligations instead of implied 
expectations. These entail greater engagement in the contract, make it less likely for employees 
to tolerate a situation of inequity, and thus increase the salience of reciprocity (Guest, 1998). 
Applied to the psychological contract, the norm of reciprocity would suggest that when one party 
 10 
(A) fulfills a promise made to the other party (B), party B feels obligated to reciprocate by 
fulfilling their promises to party A1. For example, when an employer fulfills a perceived promise 
to share information with an employee, the employer creates a reciprocal obligation, so that the 
employee is more likely to respond by fulfilling a perceived promise to share information. This 
fulfillment of promises, combined with the object of the action, (sharing information with each 
other) demonstrates market orientation resulting from the psychological contract.  
A psychological contract is a key mechanism in the internalization of core customer-
oriented values by individual employees. To explain, when employers promise stable 
employment, and promotion and development opportunities, employees reciprocate by 
promising to take actions to fulfill core values expressed by the company, including market-
oriented actions. Rousseau (1995) maintains that individuals voluntarily enter into a 
psychological contract, and choose whether they will fulfill a promise or obligation.  However, 
although there may be a voluntary element about the process, a feeling of “obligation” implies no 
choice for a conscientious person. 
The principle of reciprocity also supports the notion of equity or fairness, that is, the 
expectation of an “equal” give and take creating a balanced equity ratio (Adams, 1965). “In the 
relationship between employer and employee, mutual obligations are the central issue” 
(Anderson and Schalk, 1998, p. 640). To demonstrate, a longitudinal study involving four waves 
of data indicated that new hires’ perceptions of their own commitments were influenced by their 
perceptions of the commitments of their employer (de Vos et al., 2003). 
A matched contract indicates a match between the perceived promises of each party. 
However, this might mean that neither party places much value on the relationship. Although it 
is matched, it is not a very successful relationship over the long-term.  If neither party values the 
                                                 
1 We’d like to thank the reviewer for this suggested wording. 
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relationship, then they will not expend energy to make it successful. Instead, they may channel 
their energy away from this relationship to other more fruitful endeavors. Therefore, a high 
quality, matched contract might better represent a successful relationship. Supporting this, Shore 
and Barksdale (1998) found that contracts involving a high level of obligations from both parties 
were related to greater perceived organizational support, commitment and intent to remain with 
the organization.  
A high-quality relationship requires a foundation of trust (e.g., Flaherty and Pappas, 
2000, Lewicki and Bunker, 1996, Robinson, 1996) and has been connected to market orientation 
in customer relationships (Helfert  et al., 2002) and manufacturer-retailer relationships (Bigne 
and Blesa, 2003). Trust supports the willingness of the employer to delegate to the employee 
thereby creating an atmosphere of increased autonomy. When given autonomy, employees are 
more likely to act in market-oriented ways (Harris and Piercy, 1999). 
The psychological contract can also be connected to market orientation when fairness, 
trust, and fulfilled employee expectations create higher organizational commitment (Guest and 
Conway, 1997). Research links commitment to employee knowledge sharing attitudes and 
behaviors (Hislop, 2003), and more specifically, to firm level market-orientation (Zhang et al., 
2004). Recent empirical work, both quantitative (Dabos and Rousseau, 2004) and qualitative 
(Llewellyn, 2001), demonstrates this link between employee knowledge sharing and shared 
expectations of reciprocity. The qualitative study, conducted in a large telecommunications 
company, found that matched (reciprocal) psychological contracts encouraged the provision of 
internal customer services whereas unmatched contracts detracted from the service offering 
(Llewellyn, 2001). These arguments and research support the following hypothesis:  
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H1: Employee perceptions of high quality and matched employer obligations and 
employee obligations in the psychological contract, will be related to employee market-
oriented behaviors. 
 
Learning Orientation 
At the organizational level, learning orientation has also been connected to market 
orientation (Baker and Sinkula, 1999, Farrell, 2000, Liu et al., 2002, Slater and Narver, 1995). 
This supports a connection between learning orientation and market orientation at the individual 
level because a learning organization is built when individuals interact within the organization 
(Cho, 2002), and exchange knowledge (West and Meyer, 1997). Indeed, a learning agility or 
mindset has been noted as essential to the evolution of organizations and people (Perkins, 1994, 
Williams, 1997). 
Farrell (2000) found that top management emphasis and value placed on learning-
oriented behaviors of individuals developed the learning orientation of a company. This indicates 
that organizational learning orientation builds upon the learning agility of individual employees. 
An additional source of organizational learning arises as individuals with high learning agility 
pursue mastery goals (Bell and Kozlowski, 2002, Cho, 2002) and share their experiences (Levitt 
and March, 1988).  
An extension of organizational level theory to the market orientation of individuals 
reflects the dynamism of the individual learning process. The learning orientation of an 
individual (also referred to as “learning agility”) “is characterized by a desire to increase one’s 
competence by developing new skills and mastering new situations” (Bell and Kozlowski, 2002, 
p. 498). The correct way of acquiring information necessary to complete a task varies with the 
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frequency, heterogeneity, and causal ambiguity of a task (Zollo and Winter, 2002). For example, 
sometimes it is appropriate to learn by doing, whereas at other times it is more appropriate to 
share and to formally record the information.  Individuals with a high learning agility tend to 
persist in spite of failure, pursue more challenging tasks, and use more complex learning 
strategies (Bell and Kozlowski, 2002). Managers who value learning approach key events as 
opportunities to learn (Perkins, 1994). Learning agility at the individual level prompts 
individuals to set goals based on mastering and obtaining knowledge (Bell and Kozlowski, 
2002). This knowledge-seeking disposition supported by goal-setting aids in the completion of 
market-oriented tasks, such as acquiring information. Thus we hypothesize that learning and 
market orientation are related at an individual level of analysis. 
H2:  The more employees demonstrate a high learning agility, the more likely they are to 
perform market-oriented behaviors.   
 
Role-based Differentiation in Individual Market-Oriented Practices 
The varying degree of customer contact experienced by employees in different roles is 
anticipated to influence the extent of market-oriented actions. It is pivotal to understanding how 
market-oriented behaviors translate throughout an organization. Few previous studies included 
such a focus, preferring to target marketing and senior management teams. The few that 
considered differences across business functions contrast marketing with operations in 
manufacturing firms (e.g., Kahn, 2001) or focus on those with close customer contact in studies 
of sales force and customer orientation (e.g., Harris, 2000, Langerak, 2001). 
Employees fulfill various roles in organizations. Roles require different skills and 
abilities, some narrowly focused, some broad. Therefore, some employees may have access to 
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more market information than other employees do, and this shapes their degree of information 
generation. Other employees work in coordinating roles that enable them to develop strong inter-
functional networks and enhance their response capability. These differences in roles shape 
differences in their perceived promises to practice market-oriented behaviors.   
In general, the psychological contract has become more flexible and developed a broader 
responsibility base (Anderson and Schalk, 1998). However, traditional differences in promises 
related to market responsibilities may influence the adoption of a wider contract. For example, 
employees who experience varying degrees of customer contact and market exposure may 
perceive contract promises differently. Sales people sustain a high involvement with the market 
and increased knowledge of market needs through repeated customer contact. In contrast, 
internal administrative staff functions may consider themselves quite removed from the external 
market, and be unable to relate the meaning of their own roles to market conditions. Managers 
may unconsciously support this inference if they emphasize how internal employees with a 
market orientation exceed role obligations. In response, internal employees may be more likely 
to consider market-oriented behaviors as extra-role, and beyond the promises of their 
psychological contracts.   
Front-line customer contact and sales employees are more likely to believe that market-
oriented behaviors form an expected part of their roles because acquiring and disseminating 
market information also form extrinsic (economic) parts of their psychological contracts. For 
example, sales people are often compensated through sales commissions that directly relate to 
the ability to compete for and meet customer needs. If tasks are viewed as expected in-role 
behaviors (duties that are communicated to employees as being integral to specific role 
performance), employees are more likely to become more satisfied and committed upon task 
 15 
completion (MacKenzie et al., 1998).  So, to carry out their core role, sales, marketing and other 
employees with high customer contact must actively canvass for market information whether 
they feel satisfied or not. The fulfillment of this duty will increase their satisfaction. However, 
MacKenzie et al (1998) concluded that only employees who are satisfied with their roles and 
committed to the organization are likely to perform extra-role behaviors. Organ (1988) described 
organizational citizenship behaviors (OCBs) as discretionary behaviors that are believed to 
directly promote the effective functioning of an organization. Thus, employees in areas such as 
finance or operations who are dissatisified or uncommitted are unlikely to perform discretionary 
market orientation behaviours.  
Additionally, employees who have a high learning agility may be better able to 
understand the importance of customers to company success. They may deliberately seek out 
customers in order to better understand the needs of the market.  In this way, the more that these 
employees are exposed to customer needs, the more encouraged these learning agile employees 
will be to act in market oriented ways.  Thus, 
H3a): The more frequent their contact with customers, the more likely employees are to 
perform market-oriented behaviors. 
H3b): The frequency of customer contact will mediate the relationship between high 
learning agility and the performance of market-oriented behaviors. 
 
METHOD 
Procedure and Sample 
Membership lists from insurance associations accessed on the Internet provided contact 
information for a cross-section of employees across more than 50 North American insurance and 
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financial services companies. The Canadian sampling frame included members of the Canadian 
Life Underwriters Association (CLU) and Life Office Management Association (LOMA). The 
U.S. sampling frame included members of the North American Health Underwriters Association 
(NAHU), Insurance Accounting and Technology Professionals (IATP), Group Underwriters 
Association of America (GUAA), and the Society of Financial Service Professionals (SFSP).  
The initial survey response rate was less than 40% so actions were undertaken to 
eliminate concerns of potential non-response bias (Lambert and Harrington, 1990). Accordingly, 
the response rate was increased by a follow-up email but a number of companies and employees 
raised concerns about unsolicited emails, and it was clear that follow-up phone calls would be 
intrusive. Thus, out of 814 survey links delivered in two waves via email, the online website 
collected 138 useable responses (a response rate of 17%).  
In view of the low response rate, the effect of non-responses on survey estimates was 
clearly of concern.  Wave analysis provides a way to assess response bias (Creswell, 1994). This 
analysis assumes that the way that later, second wave respondents answer a survey will be 
similar to non-respondents.  Building on a method suggested by Lambert and Harrington (1990), 
the composition of the complete sample was compared to first and second wave respondents and 
(where possible) non respondents in terms of gender, level, region, company. The demographics 
of the first group of respondents mirrored the second wave of responses.  
Additionally the means of the first wave responses (80 responses) were compared to the 
means of the second wave responses (66 responses) for all indicators on the survey.  As there 
were no significant differences in means, respondents for the first wave and the second wave 
very likely belong to the same population. Of interest, the only item that was close to 
significance at p=.085 was one of the market orientation items.  This item asked whether the 
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respondent coordinates his/her activities with others inside the organization. Perhaps the 
widespread merger and acquisition activity occurring over this time created slight differences in 
how employees in the second wave viewed their desire and ability to internally coordinate 
knowledge management. 
The response rates of 21% Canadian and 15% U.S. (combined response rate of 17%) 
were further explored in correspondence with non-respondents. Emails from non-respondents 
provided varying reasons for the decision to abstain. These reasons were generally comparable 
between the U.S. and Canadian sample. The two main areas of difference lay in suspicion of 
researcher motives (much higher in Canada than the U.S.) and language issues (due to French 
speaking non-respondents in Quebec).  This suspicion reflects the high level of merger and 
acquisition activity faced by the financial services industry in Canada, and was unavoidable 
given the nature of an unsolicited email survey. There were also a large number of emails that 
were blocked by Internet service providers and by corporate IT departments. Overall, the wide 
variety of reasons given for not filling out the survey mitigates concern for systematic non-
response bias.     
The mean age of the sample was between 30 and 55 years of age. Seventy per cent of the 
sample were women. The mean tenure with the organisation was approximately five years. More 
than ninety per cent of the sample were found in 1) underwriting (60 observations) and 2) 
marketing (39 observations) and 3) other (30 observations). There were 29 executives, 49 middle 
management, and 60 non-supervisory respondents. More variation existed for contact with 
customers than distributors but most respondents maintained some level of contact with 
distributors. 
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Measures 
Scale items for the independent and dependent variables are attached in the Appendix. 
Psychological Contract. The state of the psychological contract was measured using a 
shorter version of Rousseau’s (1990) widely accepted scale, adapted by Gallo and McNaughton 
(2003). In Gallo and McNaughton’s study, participants were asked to 1) rate the extent to which 
the employer has made obligations with respect to the participant’s role (12 items, original α = 
.8620) and 2) to assess the extent to which the participant has made obligations to the employer 
(12 items, original α = .9210) Additionally, two composite validation items that measure the 
perceived quality of the employer-employee relationship are used in this study to validate the 
results of the first and second sections of the scale.  
Psychological Contract Match and Quality. The research considered the influence of four 
types of contracts: high quality matched, low quality matched, high quality unmatched, and low 
quality unmatched. The influence of these variables was assessed by dichotomizing the data into 
values above and below the sample median for the aggregated average of each of the employer 
and employee scales. The median ratings for employer commitments (median = 3.83) and 
employee commitments (median = 4.33) were calculated.  Values above each median indicated 
that employees perceived higher quality commitments, relative to the below-median values that 
represented lower quality commitments. Additionally, a mismatch in perceived contribution 
level, where employers were above and employees were below their respective medians, was 
termed “unmatched” when contrasted with match in positioning either above or below the 
median (“matched”).   
The match and quality in perceived employer and employee commitments to the 
psychological contract were measured by separating responses into quadrants. This technique 
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considered both the match (between employer and employee commitments) and the quality (the 
absolute level of commitments). This comparison is complicated by differing employer and 
employee promises, creating different metrics. However, different metrics are necessary because 
both parties contribute in different ways to the same contract, forcing employees to cognitively 
translate the metrics as they assess the need for reciprocity. Using this approach, other 
researchers have found that the combination of high rankings for both employer and employee 
contributions to the psychological contract is critical to firm performance (Wang et al., 2003), 
employee intention to remain (Shore and Barksdale, 1998), and career advancement (Dabos and 
Rousseau, 2004). By separating cases into these quadrants using indicator coding, it is still 
possible to evaluate the match between employer and employee commitments. Additionally, a 
better understanding of the level of each behavior is achieved.  
Individual Learning Agility. Individual learning agility was measured using a 7-item 
learning agility instrument adapted from Perkins (1994).  
Customer Contact. Customer contact was measured by assessing how often the 
participant interacted with both premium payer and distributor customers. The aggregated scale 
was dichotomized at the median of the distribution and each respondent’s value was categorized 
as either frequent or infrequent.  
Market-oriented Behaviors. The market orientation of an individual was measured using 
the I-MARKOR, a 20-item, 3 dimensional measure (Schlosser and McNaughton, under review). 
Additionally, two composite items assessing general customer focus are used in this study to 
validate I-MARKOR. 
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RESULTS 
Reliability and Validity of Measures in the Model 
Cronbach’s alpha for each scale are shown in the Appendix.  Reliability for each scale 
exceeded minimum standards of α > .70 established by Nunnally (1976). No scale items were 
discarded, as the item-to-total correlations were optimal.  
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) (using maximum likelihood) examined the stability 
of the theorized factor structure (Hair et al., 1998). Additionally, as the composite market 
orientation measure was multi-dimensional, Cronbach’s Alpha was assessed for each dimension 
(Flynn and Pearcy, 2001, Hair  et al., 1998). As Hinkin (1995) noted, reliability is a pre-
condition for validity. Inter-factor correlations and item-to-total correlations were examined to 
guard against multi-collinearity and ensure that the item and factor solution could not be 
improved upon. In analyzing actual market-oriented behaviors with CFA, the expected three-
dimensional model was compared to the two factor model (based on the EFA for market-oriented 
obligations), to a single-factor first order model, and to a single-factor second order model with 
three dimensions.  Fit indices supported a latent construct with three dimensions, with CMIN/df 
below 2 (CMIN/df = 1.72), Comparative Fit Index greater than .9 (CFI = .926), and RMSEA less 
than .08 (RMSEA = .073), as recommended by Hair, Anderson, Tatham, and Black (1998). The 
measurement model demonstrated that market-oriented behavior explained a large amount of the 
variation in three factors of information acquisition (IA, r2 =.79), information sharing (IS, r2 
=.81), and strategic response (SR, r2 = .48). 
Convergent validity was confirmed by strong correlations between 1) the I-MARKOR 
measure and validation items measuring general customer focus, and 2) the psychological 
contract measures and validation items measuring the perceived quality of the employer-
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employee relationship. Nomological validity was also indicated by strong correlations supporting 
theorized relationships. As expected, the data presented in Table 1 indicates moderate but 
significant correlations between learning agility and individual market orientation. As no 
correlation coefficient exceeded the alpha coefficient of the scale, the scales used in the study 
exhibited discriminant validity (Fornell and Larcker, 1981) and used frequently in studies (e.g., 
de Vos  et al., 2003, Harris and Ogbonna, 2001).  
 
Modeling Relationships 
Using Structural Equation Modeling (AMOS), the paths from the exogenous variables 
(learning agility, psychological contract, and customer contact) to the endogenous variable 
(market-oriented behavior) tested theorized relationships. To test hypotheses, we aggregated the 
I-MARKOR scale into three indicators by averaging the measurement items at the first order 
construct level. According to (Matsuno and Mentzer, 2000), aggregation of first order 
dimensions is justified because 1) the validity of the second order MO scale with all 20 item 
measures has been established; 2) given the sample size, aggregation allows maximization of the 
degrees of freedom in estimating the path coefficients between the MO and performance 
measures; and 3) it reduces higher levels of random error and retains the three-dimensional scale 
of market orientation. 
 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
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Antecedents to Market-oriented Behaviors 
The structural equation modeled learning as an observed variable, using the average of 
the 7 items. The variable CONTACT was an average of the customer and distributor contact 
frequencies, using indicator coding of “1” for frequent contact, and “0” for infrequent contact. 
The model tested the four quadrants of psychological contract status using 3 dummy variables: 1) 
matched low rated contract, 2) unmatched contract, greater employer commitments, and 3) 
unmatched contract, greater employee commitments. The high quality, matched relationship 
condition was chosen as the referent category because it was the hypothesized condition.   
A comparison of the models in Table 2 indicates that the first model (depicted in Figure 
1) provides the closest and most parsimonious fit to the data with the greatest explanatory value. 
Output shown in Figure 1 indicates an SEM that provided some fit to the data, generating 
absolute fit indices close to limits suggested by Hair et al. (1998), with (CMIN/DF = 2.872, p = 
.000 although still with higher than desired RMSEA = .117, p = .002). Additionally, the 
incremental model fit (CFI = .843) is close to the recommended value of .9, although the 
parsimony adjusted measure is lower than desired (PCFI = .602) and indicates that the model 
may still be overly complex. This conclusion may be reinforced by the poor RMSEA (which is 
also a parsimony-adjusted index). However, simpler models were rejected because they did not 
significantly improve model fit, and we wished to retain all variables for reasons of testing the 
theory. Previous researchers have cautioned against over-reliance on fit indices (Hu and Bentler, 
1995, McDonald and Ho, 2002) and in particular, Curran et al. (2003) suggest that RMSEA may 
not be accurate for sample sizes smaller than 200.  
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The model explains 29% of the variance in market-oriented behaviors using a sample size 
of 138. This indicates that there is sufficient power to provide a confidence rate of 90% (Cohen, 
1988). A significant negative effect is noted for a matched low quality contract (r = - .19, p = 
.042) and supports Hypothesis One. Significant effects for learning agility (r = .25, p = .004) and 
customer contact (r = .42, p = .000) support Hypotheses Two and Three a). However, Table 2 
indicates that Hypothesis Three b) is not strongly supported by the fit of Models Two and Three.  
 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
The Importance of a High-Quality Matched Contract. Study results identified that a low 
quality matched psychological contract (relative to a high quality matched contract) significantly 
and negatively affected the performance of market-oriented behaviors. This implies that 
employers must provide some level of a quality relationship in order to attract market-oriented 
behaviors from their employees. Similarly, employees must promise some level of contribution 
exceeding the median. Previous empirical research (Harris and Piercy, 1999) support this 
because results indicate employees do not perform market-oriented behaviors if there is a 
perceived lack of unity and support from upper management. 
This finding carries implications for temporary or contract workers who may perceive 
low employer and employee commitments to the long-term psychological contract. It is 
important because organizations are increasingly outsourcing administration and service through 
call centers and contract work. Contract workers are a rich source of market orientation, because 
 24 
the impermanence of their employment makes it necessary that they keep their fingers on the 
pulse of the market and provide superior services. In order to prompt employees to reciprocate 
through the sharing of market information, employers must be prepared to invest in relationships 
with temporary workers.  
Breach of the psychological contract occurs when employees perceive a difference 
between what they were promised and what they received (Morrison and Robinson, 1997). 
Although much of the psychological contract literature has focused upon contract breach (e.g., 
Morrison and Robinson, 1997, Pate et al., 2003, Robinson and Rousseau, 1994), the results of 
this survey indicate that employee perceptions of lower level obligations of both employer and 
employee are also problematic. A matched but low quality psychological contract appears to be 
more detrimental than potential inequities originating from discrepancies in the perceived level 
of each party’s obligations. Although correlations were in the expected direction (negative in 
conditions where the employee perceived low personal obligations), only the matched conditions 
were significant. 
Learning Orientation. Results highlighted the presence of a significant, albeit moderate 
relationship between the learning orientation of individuals and their market-oriented behaviors 
(r = 0.25, p = 0.0). This finding is in line with the contentions of previous researchers of 
organizational market orientation. For example, Slater and Narver (1995) noted “However, as 
important as market orientation and entrepreneurship are, they must be complemented by an 
appropriate climate to produce a learning organization.”, and Morgan suggested (2004, p. 22) 
“the development of a ‘learning climate’  may be crucial (e.g., a service firm)”.  Managers can 
develop this climate through the hiring and rewarding of employees who exhibit a learning 
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orientation. A strong learning orientation prompts employees to accept and adopt learning 
routines introduced by the company.  
This finding challenges managers because a significant antecedent of individual market-
oriented behaviors in the framework is a trait-based construct (learning orientation). According 
to Williams (1997), learning orientation is not a common trait because only 10% of managers are 
believed to be agile learners. Our research has identified market-oriented behaviors that 
organizations can ostensibly target and train employees to perform. However, if the performance 
of the market-oriented behaviors is strongly linked to trait learning orientation, then this will 
restrict the options for effective training of market-oriented behaviors in non learning-oriented 
employees. Organizations can potentially stimulate these market-oriented behaviors across all 
employees through the process of role modeling by agile learners (Wood and Bandura, 1989). 
Morgan (2004) suggests that organizational learning transcends the individual because continuity 
is established through the development of operating procedures and collective mental models 
exist in organizational memory.  
Differences in Frequency of Customer and Distributor Contact. The financial services 
industry relies upon distributors to reach premium payers. Distributor contact related to market 
orientation came up more frequently in analysis than customer contact. The frequency of 
customer and distributor contact was the strongest antecedent to the performance of market-
oriented behaviors (r = 0.42, p = 0.0). Frequent contact was measured as making contact weekly 
or more. This finding indicates that some functions must move beyond traditional notions of in-
role duties if they are to become players in the company’s strategy. Unless companies encourage 
employees in all areas to understand their customers through frequent interaction, they cannot 
pursue a market-oriented strategy. A market orientation strategy will not surpass a marketing 
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orientation unless strategy-makers in all areas endorse the strategy by providing employees the 
time to develop informal and frequent relationships with customers. This finding challenges 
practitioners who complain about internal, often Head Office employees who “live in a tower” to 
increase the opportunities for internal employees to interact with the external market. 
 
RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS  
By analysing the interpersonal mechanics of market orientation, this research refines the 
understanding of how organizations can build competitive advantage. A firm strengthens its 
competitive advantage through strong employee relationships that increase employee retention 
and performance (Eddleston  et al., 2002). Recruitment and retention of good employees is 
important to the realization of market based assets, such as intellectual and relational capital 
(McNaughton et al., 2001), and underlines a need for employee market orientation and 
relationship management.  Good-quality employee relationships also provide a base to develop 
strong customer relationships that foster customer loyalty (Day, 2000), and strong channel 
relationships that provide production and distribution advantages (Helfert  et al., 2002). 
This research seeks to remedy a gap in the current market orientation literature by 
increasing understanding of employee perspectives and behaviors. It contributes by testing the 
linkage between matched psychological contracts and the accomplishment of market-oriented 
behaviors. Such a linkage indicates that more than a top-down market orientation strategy is 
required for an employee to perform market-oriented behaviors. Additionally, the employee must 
perceive a strong relationship with their employer, expressed through the psychological contract.   
In his appraisal of market orientation research, Langerak (2003) concluded that the nature 
of the link between organizational market orientation and performance has not yet been 
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adequately explained. This suggests that other considerations may shape the success of a market-
oriented strategy.  This research has described and tested how and why individual employees 
may perform market-oriented routines underpinning the market orientation of the organization.  
Consideration of individual in the creation of a customer orientation largely been tested 
with employees in sales and marketing (e.g., Pettijohn and Pettijohn, 2002). In contrast, we 
considered employees throughout the company. Most empirical market orientation studies 
gathered information from manufacturing companies, and only recently have studies considered 
the service sector (e.g., Gray et al., 2003, Harris and Piercy, 1999, Kennedy  et al., 2002).  
 
 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
This research highlights the difficulty in canvassing lower level employees without 
organizational sponsorship of the research. This survey approached financial services 
professionals who were members of industry associations, and thus may be employed in more 
senior roles within their own organizations. In future research, a sponsoring company would 
broaden the type of employee who participates, and increase the sample size and response rate to 
the survey. An increased sample size might improve model fit, by decreasing errors of 
approximation (signaled by a high RMSEA in the current study). Working with one company 
could extend the current study by allowing the collection of survey data at different times, 
combating method bias, and permitting longitudinal study of causal relationships. It would also 
be of great practical and academic value to gain the insight of “extra-firm” respondents, as 
suggested by Harris (2003). 
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  Future researchers might consider the influence of mentoring on employee learning 
orientation and the performance of market-oriented behaviors. Employees’ beliefs that their 
managers expect and model market-oriented behaviors will prompt employees to practice similar 
market-oriented behaviors.  For example, Jaworski and Kohli (1993) found that top management 
emphasis develops the market orientation of a company. In a related line of inquiry, Farrell 
(2000) concluded that top management emphasis and value placed on learning-oriented 
behaviors developed the learning orientation of a company. Co-worker behaviors are linked 
empirically to individual workplace behaviors, for example, coworker organizational citizenship 
behaviors influence individual levels of organizational citizenship behavior (Bommer et al., 
2003). In spite of this direction, there has been little study of modeling in the market orientation 
literature. A recent article (Jones  et al., 2003), considered social exchange and leader influence 
on employee market-oriented behavior, but findings were inconclusive. Modeling offers a rich 
venue for future research into the transference of market-oriented behaviors throughout the 
organization.   
 
CONCLUSION 
Although often assessed at an organizational level, a market-oriented culture is supported 
by the attitudes and actions of the organization’s employees. A firm cannot develop a market 
orientation strategy without each employee’s active understanding, willingness, and ability to 
perform in a market-oriented fashion. Therefore, individual employees must experience a 
responsibility to gather and assess the value of market information, and a willingness to share it 
with other employees.  
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This research identified important individual level antecedents that organizations must 
account for when attempting to stimulate company-wide market-oriented behaviors. These 
include the fostering of high quality and matched psychological contracts, modeling of learning 
strategies by agile learners, and increased opportunities and time to develop personal employee-
customer relationships throughout the firm.   
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APPENDIX  
Scales Used in the Study 
 
Learning Agility α = .7191 
 
1. I can better understand and deal with situations that present difficulties or new challenges 
if I try out new concepts and skills.   
2. I adjust or change my approach to learning to match new situations or content that arise 
in different learning settings   
3. I will make and defend judgments about new situations or challenges that may challenge 
the consensus of others    
4. I adjust new learning to complement prior knowledge   
5. I see ways in which current knowledge can be effectively applied to other, seemingly 
unrelated situations      
6. I willingly take an active role in meeting and effectively dealing with issues arising from 
new situations     
7. I construct mental models or knowledge maps of information learned from feedback, 
successes or failures    
 
Psychological Contract 
 
A. Consider your relationship with your current employer. To what extent has your 
employer made the following commitment or obligation to you?  α = .9586 
 
1. Concern for my personal welfare     
2. Opportunity for career development within this firm   
3. Secure employment       
4. Be responsive to my personal concerns and well-being   
5. Developmental opportunities with this firm     
6. Wages and benefits I can count on      
7. Make decisions with my interest in mind     
8. Advancement within the firm      
9. Steady employment       
10. Concern for my long-term well-being      
11. Opportunities for promotion      
12. Stable benefits for employees’ families     
 
B. To what extent have you made the following commitment or obligation to your 
employer?  
α = .9043  
 
1. Make personal sacrifices for this organization 
2. Seek out developmental opportunities that enhance my value to this employer  
3. Remain with this organization indefinitely     
4. Take this organization’s concerns personally     
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5. Build skills to increase my value to this organization     
6. Plan to stay here a long time      
7. Protect this organization’s image      
8. Make myself increasingly valuable to my employer    
9. Continue to work here     
10. Commit myself personally to this organization    
11. Actively seek internal opportunities for training and development   
12. Make no plans to work anywhere else     
 
Psychological Contract Validation  
 
1. In general, my employer has not lived up to its promises (REVERSE CODE)   
2. Overall, my employer has fulfilled its commitments to me   
3. In general, I don’t live up to my promises to my employer (REVERSE CODE)  
4. Overall, I am satisfied in my job     
 
I-MARKOR α = .9409 
 
Information Acquisition α = .9250  
 
1. I ask distributors to assess the quality of our products and services. 
2. I interact with agencies to find out what products or services customers will need in the 
future. 
3. In my communication with distributors, I periodically review the likely effect of changes in 
our business environment (e.g., company mergers and acquisitions) on customers. 
4. I take responsibility to detect fundamental shifts in our industry (e.g., competition, 
technology, regulation) in my communication with distributors. 
5. I talk to or survey those who can influence our customers’ purchases (e.g., distributors). 
6. I review our product development efforts with distributors to ensure that they are in line with 
what customers want. 
7. I participate in informal “hall talk” that concerns our competitor’s tactics or strategies. 
8. I collect industry information through informal means (e.g., lunch with industry friends, talks 
with trade partners). 
  
Information Dissemination α = .8864 
 
9. I participate in interdepartmental meetings to discuss market trends and developments. 
10. I let appropriate departments know when I find out that something important has happened to 
a major distributor or market. 
11. I coordinate my activities with the activities of coworkers or departments in this organization. 
12. I pass on information that could help company decision-makers to review changes taking 
place in our business environment. 
13. I communicate market developments to departments other than marketing. 
14. I communicate with our marketing department concerning market developments. 
15. I try to circulate documents (e.g., emails, reports, newsletters) that provide information on 
my distributor contacts and their customers to appropriate departments 
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Co-ordination of Strategic Response α = .8370 
 
16. I try to bring a customer with a problem together with a product or person that helps the 
customer to solve that problem. 
17. I try to help distributors achieve their goals. 
18. I respond quickly if a distributor has any problems with our offerings. 
19. I take action when I find out that customers are unhappy with the quality of our service. 
20. I jointly develop solutions for customers with members of our customer / advisor relationship 
team. 
 
Customer Focus Validation 
 
5. I am primarily interested in satisfying my company’s customers  
6. I am primarily interested in satisfying the customers who sell my company’s product  
7. It will help me do my job if I better understand my company’s distributors    
8. It will help me do my job if I better understand the distributors who sell my company’s 
products      
 
 
TABLE 1 
Correlations between Variables in the Model 
  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Low quality employee, low 
quality employer psych contract 
1 -.257(**) -.287(**) -.204(*) -.267(**) -.177(*) -.286(**) -.254(**) 
2. High quality employee, low 
quality employer psych contract 
-.257(**) 1 -.126 -.082 .031 .019 .010 .070 
3. Low quality employee, high 
quality employer psych contract 
-.287(**) -.126 1 -.015 .095 .064 .089 .111 
4. Learning Agility -.204(*) -.082 -.015 1 .320(**) .311(**) .252(**) .261(**) 
5. Market oriented Behaviors -.267(**) .031 .095 .320(**) 1 .921(**) .898(**) .749(**) 
6. Information Acquisition -.177(*) .019 .064 .311(**) .921(**) 1 .728(**) .561(**) 
7. Information Dissemination -.286(**) .010 .089 .252(**) .898(**) .728(**) 1 .556(**) 
8. Co-ordination of Strategic 
Response 
-.254(**) .070 .111 .261(**) .749(**) .561(**) .556(**) 1 
 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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FIGURE 1 
Market-oriented Behaviors with Hypothesized Relationships 
 
CMIN/df = 2.872 
CFI = .843 
PCFI = .602 
RMSEA = .117  p = .002 
 
 
High Quality 
Unmatched 
Contract 
Low Quality 
Unmatched 
Contract 
Low Quality 
Matched 
Contract 
Customer 
Contact 
Learning 
Agility 
Market 
Orientation 
Information 
Acquisition 
Information 
Dissemination 
Strategic 
Response 
-.05 
-.19 .11 
.42 
.25 
.85 
.84 .64 
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TABLE 2 
 
Fit Indices 
 
Model R2 CMIN/df CFI PCFI RMSEA 
Model 1 all 
direct paths 
.29 2.872 .843 .602 .117  p=.002 
Model 2 
complete 
contact 
mediation 
.28 3.202 .816 .583 .127  p=.000 
Model 3 partial 
contact 
mediation 
.31 2.912 .848 .575 .118  p=.002 
Model 4 no 
contact 
.14 3.868 .748 .561 .145  p=.000 
Model 5 no 
learning 
orientation 
.28 3.150 .811 .608 .125  p=.000 
Model 6 no 
psychological 
contract 
.25 2.872 .820 .673 .117  p=.001 
Model 7 
including 
country of 
residence 
.29 2.997 .784 .470 .121, p = .000 
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